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NOTES
Antitrust Law--State Action Immunity and State "Neutrality" in
Regulated and Compelled Activities
In Parker v. Brown the United States Supreme Court held that

there was nothing "in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
to suggest that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature."1 The state action exemption 2 recognized in Parker faced one of its rare Supreme Court tests
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' This review was particularly timely
in light of several recent analyses of the Parker doctrine, 4 the apparent

confusion among lower federal courts about the scope of the exemption,5 and the absence of a. definitive statement setting the parameters

of the doctrine in its most recent pre-Detroit Edison test.'

While De-

troit Edison did not overrule Parker, it did eliminate an exemption
1. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). Parker dealt with the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1970). Specific attention was paid to §§ 1 & 2, which provide:
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce *among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . . Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by
sections 1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
2. For a summary of the range of additional exemptions, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 102-20 (2d ed. 1974).
3. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). The Parker doctrine was also at issue in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), and Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See text accompanying notes 27-41 infra.
4. See, e.g., Donnem, FederalAntitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTrRUST L.J. 950 (1970); Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976); Posner, The
Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust
Defense: An Analysis of the Parkerv. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 61 (1974);
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (197.4); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rv.328 (1975).
5. Compare Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), and Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of
America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966), with Washington Gas Light Co.
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Verkuil,
supra note 4, at 331 n.17.
6. See text accompanying notes 36-41 infra.
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based solely on state action in areas in which state policy is defined
by the Court to be neutral-areas in which the Detroit Edison Court
7
recognized an exemption.based essentially on economic criteria.
At issue in Detroit Edison was the practice of the Detroit Edison
Company 8 of supplying light bulbs to its customers in exchange for
their burned-out bulbs. The company supplied, at no extra charge, approximately fifty percent of the bulbs of the kinds most frequently used
by its residential customers.9 The program purported to increase the
consumption of electricity. Antitrust action was brought by the owner
of a drug store who alleged that the light bulb exchange program had
damaged his business. 10 The defense offered by Detroit Edison was
that its activity fell within the Parker v. Brown state action exemption:
the company argued that the program had been approved by the
Michigan Public Service Commission" and it was powerless to discontinue the service without further approval. In other words, the program had become compulsory and therefore was within the realm of
state action.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on
Parker v. Brown grounds.' 2 The decision was affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals,' 8 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4 The Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the holding of
the lower court and found that a Parker v. Brown exemption was not
7. The Court was severely divided. While the holding was supported by a clear
six to three majority, it is difficult to ascertain a majority rationale. See text accompanying notes 51-63 infra.
8. The Detroit Edison Company is the sole supplier of electricity in southeastern
Michigan. Its marketing area includes about five million people. 96 S. Ct. at 3113.
9. The cost of the light bulbs was included (in an accounting to the Michigan
Public Service Commission) as an expense of Detroit Edison. Since utility rates were
calculated on an average cost basis, the bulbs were obviously not free. However, no
profit was recorded as arising directly from the exchange program. 96 S. Ct. at 3113-14.
10. Plaintiff originally asserted that the program violated § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
96 S. Ct. at 3112-13 n.3.
11. The Commission is vested with complete power to regulate all utilities in Michiigan including "rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules and conditions of service .
MicH. STAT..ANN. § 22.13(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
12. 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The district court relied heavily on
the language in Parker to the effect that a price fixing agreement among California
raisin growers was not in violation of federal antitrust laws as long as it "'derived
its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not
intended to become effective without that command."' Id. at 1111 (quoting 317 U.S.
at 350).
13. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) (mem.).
14. 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
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applicable. 15 The case was remanded for determination of whether the
program, stripped of its state action immunity, was in fact a Sherman
Act violation.'
While this holding was supported by a clear majority
of the Court, the six Justices favoring reversal were split in such a manner as to make it difficult to discern a common rationale. 17 The implications of the holding, the split within the Court, and the problems
that are almost certain to be faced by lower courts in their attempts
to apply Detroit Edison are best understood in the context of Parker
v. Brown and its subsequent interpretations.
The dispute in Parker was the result of actions taken pursuant to
the California Agricultural Prorate Act of 1933.18 The Act established
procedures within which price stabilization programs for agricultural
commodities could be instituted.'
These programs utilized price
floors and production controls and involved the withholding of excess
output from market. One such program, initiated for regulation of raisin production, was challenged by Brown, a California producer, who
sought to enjoin Parker, the State Director of Agriculture, from enforcing it.20 In a unanimous decision the Court declared the Sherman Act
to be inapplicable. It did not evaluate the program in light of the Sherman Act but made, in essence, a jurisdictional decision. In writing for
the Court, Justice Stone indicated that once the program was estab15. 96 S. Ct. at 3123.
16. Id. at 3121 n.38, 3123.
17. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion for himself and Justices Brennan,
Marshall and White. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Powell
and Rehnquist joined.
18. 317 U.S. at 344.
19. The Act created the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, which, upon
the petition of ten producers of a particular commodity (in this case raisins), would
hold public hearings and determine whether the establishment of a prorate marketing
plan for the commodity in a specified zone would "prevent agricultural waste and
preserve agricultural wealth." Id. at 346. When it was determined that a program
was advisable, the Commission was authorized to select a committee to formulate the
specifics of the plan. Upon consent of 65% of the zone's producers who jointly owned
at least 51% of the acreage devoted to the regulated crop, the plan would bzcome
effective. The program was enforced by fines levied against any producer who sold
or any handler who received "without proper authority" a commodity for which a
program was in effect. Id. at 347.
20. The case originated as a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the price fixing program. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 .(S.D. Cal. 1941).
Upon appeal from the district court the United States Supreme Court thought it appropriate that the Sherman Act inquiry be made. Justice Stewart indicated that this inquiry
was probably in response to an interim decision, Georgia v. Evans, 310 U.S. 159 (1942),
which held that a state is a "person"f within the meaning of § 7 of the Sherman
Act and reflected the concern of the Court with the relationship of states to federal
antitrust legislation. 96 S. Ct. at 3115.
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lished as being a product of state legislation, the Sherman Act would
not have preemptive effect. 21 The fundamental consideration of the
Court is clear from its statement that "in a dual system of government
in which . . . the states are sovereign ...

aft unexpressed purpose to

nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress. '2 The Court, however, refused to permit
states to give immunity "to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful. 28
Thus, the Court distinguished actions that "derived [their] authority
and efficacy from the legislative command of the state" 24 from actions
of a predominately private nature. In light of the Detroit Edison plurality opinion that Parker is distinguishable from Detroit Edison on the
basis of defendant's status as a state official, 25 it is essential to note that
the Parker Court did not indicate whether it would have ruled differently had defendant not been a state official.26
In the post-Parker era the United States Supreme Court has only
twice decided cases in which some clarification of the state action exemption doctrine was required. 7 In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.28 the Court considered the 1937 Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act,29 which exempted from the Act "contracts or. agreements prescribing minimum prices for

. . .

resale"

when such contracts are lawful under local law.80 The fact that Louisiana statutes permitted resale price maintenance agreements exempted such agreements from the Act; 31 additionally, Louisiana law in21. 317 U.S. at 350. It should be noted that the exemption of "state action"
from antitrust legislation does not foreclose the possibility of obtaining the soughtafter relief on a procedural due process basis. See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 330,
354-56.
22. 317 U.S. at 351. Parker was not the first case to recognize this policy with
regard to the Sherman Act. See Olsen v. Smith, 195.U.S. 332 (1904); Lowenstein
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). These cases are cited and discussed by Handler, supra note 4, at 8, 9.
23. 317 U.S. at 351.
24. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
25. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
26. At least two commentators have interpreted the Parker decision as allowing
for state action exemptions even when defendant is not a state official. See Handler,
supra note 4, at 8-9; Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust
Laws: Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 46 ILL. L. REv. 349,
366 (1951).
27. See note 3 supra.
28. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
29. Ch. 690, tit. VIII, § 1, 50 Stat. 693 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
30. Id.
31. Now LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:392 (West 1965).
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cluded a "nonsigner" proviso 32 that bound retailers who were not party
to a price maintenance agreement to the same resale terms as contracting retailers. Calvert Distillers brought suit to enjoin Schwegmann
Brothers, a nonsigning retailing chain, from selling at prices below the
agreed-upon minimum. Schwegmann Brothers contended that the
nonsigner proviso was beyond the scope of the Miller-Tydings amendment. A divided Court agreed that the amendment was not so expansive as to permit enforcement of the nonsigner clause. 8 The Court
further held that Calvert Distillers was not acting within an area afforded Parker v. Brown protection. The Court reasoned that although
nonsigner compliance was compelled by the state and therefore arguably protected by Parker v. Brown, the original price fixing agreement
between Calvert and the signing retailers was voluntary. 4 Thus,
Louisiana laws permitted but did not compel the original agreement;
neither did they compel the effect of the nonsigner provision. While
there has been disagreement about whether Schwegmann modified or
simply clarified Parker,33 the holding is clearly to the effect that the
Parker exemption calls for state compulsion or a high degree of state
participation.
The Parker v.. Brown doctrine was applied again by the Court in
1975 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar."' In Goldfarb a unanimous
Court found that enforcement by the Virginia State Bar of a minimum
fee schedule for lawyers established by the Fairfax County Bar Association was in violation of the Sherman Act.17 Although the Virginia
legislature had authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to "regulate the
practice of law"38 and designated the State Bar to act as an administrative agency of the court,39 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
32. The nonsigner clause read as follows:

Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any cornmodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant
to the provision of section 1 [§ 9809.1] of this act, whether the person so
advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract,
is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby.
341 U.S. at 387 n.2 (emphasis by the Court). It currently appears in substantially
the same form as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:394 (West 1965).
33. 341 U.S. at 388-89.
34. 341 U.S. at 389. This analysis is taken from Simmons & Fornaciari, supra
note 4, at 66-67.
35. Compare Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 4, at 67, with Rahi, supra note
26, at 366.
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. Id. at 793.
38. Id. at 788.
39. VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974).
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this authorization was not sufficient for the price fixing activity to be
deemed "state action." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
indicated that the "threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant
to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign." 40 The fact that anticompetitive activity was "prompted" by
the state was not to be equated with compulsion by the state."' The
Court in Goldfarb did not consider the question of whether a Parker
exemption was only applicable in suits in which state officials are defendants. Whether the Court simply preferred to make its decision on
other grounds or regarded the employment affiliation of defendant as
inapposite is not clear.
Lower federal court interpretations of Parker have not been uniform. In the context of Detroit Edison, it is most instructive to compare the interpretation of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 2 with that
employed by the Fifth Circuit in Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co."8
In both cases the practices of state regulated utilities were challenged
as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 In both cases defendants
claimed an exemption based on Parker v. Brown. In Washington Gas
Light plaintiff argued that no inference of state approval could be made
since there had been no investigation or affirmative approval by the relevant regulatory commission;4 5 however, the Fourth Circuit indicated
its willingness to infer consent from silence and ruled that Parker was
applicable.46
40. 421 U.S. at 790 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 791.
42. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
43. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
44. At issue in Washington Gas Light were promotional practices of Virginia
Electric & Power Company (VEPCO). The company compensated builders through
the use of a rebate program for the costs of installing underground transmission lines.
The amount of the rebate was a function of the degree to which a home was "all
electric." 438 F.2d at 250. Rebate programs similar to those in Washington Gas
Light were also at issue in Gas Light Co. In addition plaintiff challenged a quantity
discount rate system and a plan allowing consumers to pay their bills in 12 equal
installments. 440 F.2d at 1137.
45. 438 F.2d at 252.
46. Id. In Washington Gas Light the court expressed concern that plaintiff did
not exhaust the remedies available through the state regulatory commission, indicating
that this consideration may have been a factor in the decision. This is noted in
Kinter & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Imtmunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L REV.
527, 532 (1974), and Verkuil, supra note 4, at 337-38. The Fifth Circuit has rejected
an exhaustion of state remedies requirement. See Woods Exploration & Producing
.Co. v. Aluminum Co.of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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In Gas Light Co. the Fifth Circuit rejected the "consent by-silence" reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. While the court found enough
active state supervision in the form of full adversary hearings 47 to find

Parker applicable, it drew limits, stating, "it is not necessary for us to
extend the Parker exclusion to the point of its extension in Washington

Gas Light and we do not do so."4

Of these two approaches it is clear

that the Fifth Circuit's stricter requirement of greater than general su-

pervision is more typical than the approach employed by the Fourth
Circuit in Washington .Gas Light.49 Of equal importance in view of
the likely repercussions of Detroit Edison is the uniform tendency of

the lower federal courts to avoid substantive economic analysis in making a Parkerv. Brown decision. 50
404 U.S. 1047 (1972), cited in Kinter & Kaufman, supra, at 532 n.32. In addition,
the decision may be partially explained by the tendency of the courts to view state
regulated utilities in a more favorable light with respect to the Parker exemption than
private enterprises. According to Professor Verkuil, 'The rationale of that case
[Washington Gas Light] is firmly rooted in the public utility/public calling context."
Verkuil, supra note 4, at 353.
47. 440 F.2d at 1140.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc., v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974);
United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Mamell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
See also Kinter & Kaufman, supra note 46, at 533. While the degree of supervision
has been the overriding issue in many lower court cases, the courts also have looked
to the legitimacy of the state purpose and evidence of legislative compulsion. See,
e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). These cases
are cited in Note, Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee Schedules:
Learned Professions and State-Action Immunity, 53 N.C.L. REv. 399, 406 nn.53-55
(1974).
50. See cases cited note 49 supra. As will be discussed, the Court's decision
in Detroit Edison may force the lower federal courts to make substantive economic
analyses. See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. The decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), provides a good example of
the careful reasoning required to make a Parker v. Brown analysis without becoming
involved in economic policy. In Whitten both parties were involved in competitive
bidding for contracts to build swimming pools and supply swimming pool equipment
for public and quasi-public institutions. The bids were based on specifications that
were drafted by an architect employed by the buyers. Paddock Pools, Inc., had experienced a great deal of success in influencing the architect to adopt plans that were
particularly well suited to Paddock's prefabricated. filtering systems, thus placing Paddock in an advantageous competitive position. Paddock contended that its practices
were afforded a Parker v. Brown state action exemption as a result of adoption of
its plans by the public body. In vacating the summary judgment for Paddock Pools
granted by the district court, the First Circuit indicated that Parker was applicable
only in cases in which "government determines that competition is not the summum

214

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Given the importance of the decision to grant a state action exemption and the various standards employed by the lower federal
courts, the decision in Detroit Edison deserves careful examination as
a possible guidepost to future decisions. The plurality opinion, written
by Justice Stevens, viewed the light bulb exchange program as falling
outside of Parker v. Brown, and offered an alternative method of determining whether an activity is to be afforded an exemption. Justice
Stevens distinguished Detroit Edison by indicating that, unlike Parker,
defendant in the original suit was not a state official; hence, Parkerwas
not controlling. The plurality considered it an open question whether
Parker might have been decided differently if charges had been brought
against private parties implementing state programs rather than against
state officials."'
Justice Stevens offered for the plurality a two-step analysis for determining whether an activity qualifies for a Sherman Act exemption.
First, the fairness of not applying a Parker exemption to activity compelled by state law was examined.52 This inquiry was particularly relevant in light of the possibility of treble damages. On this point Justice
Stevens did not distinguish a state regulated utility from a private business (as in Schwegmann). The plurality reasoned that Detroit Edison,
by playing a dominant role in the decision to maintain the light bulb
exchange program, did not qualify for immunity under a "state action"
rationale. The plurality distinguished this case from others in which
the private party actually obeyed a state order or in which the state's
role was so dominant that it would be unfair to hold the private party
responsible. In short, while Detroit Edison was compelled to continue
the program, -it was not compelled to initiate the program. As a result
of this exercise of free choice in implementation of the program the
threat of treble damages was not regarded as unfair!"
The second step of the plurality's analysis concerned the appropriateness of superimposing federal antitrust regulations on state utilities
regulations. 5 4 The plurality rejected the contention that federal antitrust laws should not be applied in areas already regulated by state
bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form
of public regulation." Id. at 30. The existence of a bidding program was regarded
as clear evidence that there had been no decision to eliminate -competition. Id. at
31.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 3122.
52. Id. at 3117-19.
53. Id. at 3118-19.
54. Id. at 3117, 3119.
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Instead, the plurality declared that federal interests are not

to be "inevitably... subordinated to the State's."'55 Thereby, the plurality exhibited a willingness to consider each activity of the public utility
on an individual basis.5

6

Finding no evidence that the Michigan legis-

lature or the regulatory commission desired to regulate actively the light
bulb market, the plurality regarded the state's policy as neutral.

While

this neutrality was regarded as sufficient to preclude a "state action" exemption, it was not considered necessary. -Thus,.once a firm has ventured into a field in which it is not a natural monopoly, or when there
is no other economic basis for an antitrust exemption, the plurality has
indicated its willingness to deny a state action exemption, even if there

is state regulation.58 Acording to Justice Stevens, the "Court has consistently refused to find that regulation gave rise to an implied exemp-

tion without first determining that exemption was necessary in order
to make the regulatory act work, 'and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary.' 59 The basis of this deblaration was the belief that
the relationship between federal laws and state regulation should parallel that found between federal laws and federal regulation."0

Two facets of Detroit Edison are particularly important for future
applications of Parker v. Brown. First, a majority of the Court defin-

itively rejected the notion that Parker applies solely to suits against
state officials."1 A second conclusion may be derived by joining the
plurality's willingness to make substantive economic analyses in almost
all areas of state activity 62 with the Chief Justice's willingness to make
55. Id. at 3119.
56. Id. To support this willingness to inquire into the individual activities of
state-regulated utilities the plurality offered its interpretation of the "threshold inquiry"
language of Goldfarb. According to the pluality, the "threshold inquiry" of whether
anticompetitive activity is required by a state is not dispositive with respect to an
antitrust exemption. Instead, it is only the initial step. 96 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
57. Id. at 3114.
58. Id. at 3119-20.
59. Id. at 3120 (footnote omitted) Cquoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973), which was quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
60. 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
61. Only the four members of the plurality were willing to narrow Parker to
this extent.
62. It must be recalled that the plurality recognized what it regarded as state
neutrality vis-4-vis the light bulb exchange program, but did not regard neutrality as
necessary to preclude Sherman Act exemption. It would instead apply a form of substantive economic analysis. It would allow exemptions in cases of natural monopoly
and, perhaps, in agricultural programs similar to the one in Parker. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra. At this point the plurality really no longer spoke in terms
of a Parker v. Brown exemption. The Parker Court reasoned that there was no evi-
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the same type of analysis in areas he regards as neutral vis--vis state
policy.6 This "majority" indicated that approval of a program by a
dence that Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act to restrain "a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-51. There
was no economic analysis to be made. Parker was based on the nature of the federal
system, see text accompanying notes 21-24 supra, and simply stated that state legislative command was not to be preempted by the Sherman Act; therefore, it is inappropriate to label an exemption based on an economic rationale as a Parkerexemption.
63. Although the Chief Justice joined with the plurality in holding that the light
bulb exchange program was beyond Parker v. Brown protection, he disagreed with
that part of the plurality opinion that would narrow Parkerto suits against state officials.
96 S. Ct. at 3123. The Chief Justice pointed out that the emphasis in Parker v.
Brown was not on individuals per se, but on activities. Accordiig'to the Chief Justice,
if the plurality's reading of Parker had been applied in Goldfarb, the decision in that
case could have been based on no more than finding that the Virginia Bar was a
voluntary 6rganization, not a state agency. Thus, the plurality approach was deemed
inconsistent with that employed just one year earlier in which the Court viewed the
degree of state supervision as decisive. Id.
The Chief Justice's concurrence with the holding of the plurality was based on
what he agreed was a state policy of neutrality with respect to the light bulb exchange
program. Id. at 3124. Whether he would go as far as the plurality in allowing federal
intrusion in cases of nonneutrality is not entirely clear. On one hand he expressed
general agreement with those parts of the plurality opinion that called for this more
intrusive analysis, yet when discussing the specifics of his rationale, he spoke only
in terms of "neutrality" or the need for an "independent regulatory purpose." Id.
It is essential to note that the "neutrality" in Detroit Edison is quite different from
that involved in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
Schwegmann took place in the context of a private business and involved individual
conduct that was permitted by Louisiana law. The state took no active role and the
individual found that taking advantage of a law that permitted certain conduct was
no assurance that the conduct would be exempt from the Sherman Act. In Detroit
Edison the conduct was by a state regulated utility that had to have the express approval
of the state regulatory agency.
Justice Blackmun also rejected the plurality's narrowing of Parker to suits against
state officials. Id. at 3128 n.5. His agreement with the holding of the court is based
on what he regarded as evidence of congressional intent for the Sherman Act to have
preemptive effect with respect to inconsisfent state laws. Citing congressional action
to exempt specific activities from the Sherman Act, Justice Blackmun concluded that
if a general state action exemption were desired Congress would have provided for
it. Id. at 3125-26.
The dissenting Justices, led by Justice Stewart, agreed with the Chief Justice that
the "state officials only" interpretation of Parker offered by the plurality was entirely
too narrow. Id. at 3129. They would have disposed of the case through a twostep analysis. First, the actions of Detroit Edison in proposing what may have been
an anticompetitive program would not be.subject to the Sherman Act under Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), cited in
96 S. Ct. at 3133. In Noerr the Court held that the Sherman Act "does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would
produce a restraint or a monopoly.". 365 U.S. at 136. Second, once the plan was
approved, and Detroit Edison was in effect required to continue it, the activities were
protected by Parker. 96 S. Ct. at 3133.
In supporting its own conclusion that all the activities of Detroit Edison were
beyond the Sherman Act, the dissent relied on the legislative history of the Act and
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state regulatory agency is not necessarily'to be regarded as sufficient

evidence of affirmative (or nonneutral) state policy deserving a Parker
exemption; therefore, it is clear that an approach like that employed
by the Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light would now be inappropriate.
Precisely what constitutes "nonneutrality" after Detroit Edison is
not clear; therefore, the lower federal courts are faced with continuing

problems of interpretation. First, is state policy neutral? Clearly, approval by state agencies is .not sufficient to find nonneutrality.

Sec-

ondly, if state policy is neutral, does the activity have validity in terms
of the state's regulatory goals?

This question, of course, opens the

door to economic analysis. In answering this question the courts will
have to determine whether a natural monopoly does exist or whether

there is some other economic basis foi anticompetitive activity. Market
analysis, the weighing of.competing economic interests and detailed examination of regional economic conditions may be required just to determine whether the activity should be open to Sherman Act review.
Underlying.the reasoning of a majority of the Court is an apparent
desire to treat the relationship between federal legislation and state reg-

gulation in the same manner as the relationship between federal legislation and federal regulation.6 4 In order to permit this analogous treat-

ment the majority either ignored Parker's role in balancing federal and
state interests or felt that the federalism justification for Parker must

be subordinated to the public interest in efficient allocation of economic
an analysis of the historical context of Parker v. Brown. The dissent cited language
from the legislative history of the Sherman Act indicating that the Act was not intended "'to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to occupy
doubtful grounds."' Id. at 3137 (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890)). It then described the post-1890 period
as one of "retroactive" expansion of the jurisdictiodfal reach of the Sherman Act due
in large part to expanded interpretation of the commerce clause. Id. at 3138. According to the dissent, without this expanded interpretation of the commerce clause and
the parallel expansion of the Sherman Act, Parker v. Brown would not have arisen.
Once it did arise, though, the dissent viewed the decision as the "best possible" accommodation of the original Sherman Act intent and its post-1890 commerce clause expansion. Id. at 3139.
64. The exact language of the plurality is: "Congress could hardly have intended
state regulatory agencies to have broader power than federal agencies to exempt private
conduct from the antitrust laws." 96 S. CL at 3120. As the dissent correctly notes,
the premise that state regulatory agencies could provide exemptions to federal legislation is itself invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 3135.
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resources.65 Either way, Parker was not carefully considered in the
majority's balance..
The decision in Detroit Edison is also clear evidence that the
Court stands firm in its willingness to provide a forum for review collateral to that available through state and federal regulatory agencies.66
By lowering the Parker v. Brown barrier the Court seems to have increased the role of the lower federal courts in this area. To the extent
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 7 is part of the process of balancing state and federal interests in a dual system of government, a
broad interpretation of Parker would seem to further this objective by
forcing plaintiffs to place primary reliance on remedies available through
state regulatory agencies.6 8 Here again the Court seemed to assign relatively little importance to this facet of Parker.
One additional aspect of the Detroit Edison opinion must be underscored: it is entirely conceivable that a utility could go through the
entire regulatory process and, after gaining state approval of its rates
and proposed programs, find that it is liable for treble damages in an
antitrust action. The decision in Detroit Edison would not permit this
result "if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the command of his state sovereign."6 9 However, the Court did not equate continuing practices that defendant proposed and have become compulsory
with obeying the initial command of the state. As a result, when formulating proposals, state regulated utilities must be conscious of federal
antitrust legislation as well as state regulatory policies.
In Detroit Edison*the Court calls for economic justification for
Sherman Act exemptions in those areas of activity in which state policy
is deemed to be "neutral." Neutrality was found to exist even though
the program in question was that of a regulated utility and had been
approved by the state regulatory agency. The Court seemed to discount the role Parker v. Brown has played in the delicate process of
balancing federal and state interests. If one views Parker'srole in bal65. In the case of federal law/state regulation, this objective runs 'directly into
the constitutional issue of the allocation of power between federal and state interests.
See Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. '1164 n.8 (1975).
66. Accord, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1978 (1976).
67. According to Professor Verkuil, "Primary jurisdiction directs a federal court
to dismiss or stay an antitrust action pending a resolution of the challenged conduct
by the appropriate administrative agency." Verkuil, supra note 4, at 348-49 (footnote
omitted).
68. See Handler, supra note 4, at 13-14; Verkuil, supra note 4, at 340-50.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 3117.
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ancing these interests as transcending the public interest in alocative
efficiency, the decision may represent injudicious tampering. On the
other hand, if one views the balancing process and the benefits of allocative efficiency as concerns of comparable magnitude, then the net
benefit from the tradeoff may not be apparent for some time.
JEFFREY LYNCH HARRISON

Civil Procedure-Collateral Estoppel: The Fourth Circuit
Squeezes an Oversized Judgment Through a Narrow Issue
Collateral estoppel' is a procedural doctrine whereby essential
issues that have been decided in a prior action are treated as conclusive in any subsequent proceeding, thus foreclosing a party from relitigating the same issue.2 Among the policy objectives collateral estoppel furthers are safeguarding against inconsistent results and avoiding
needless litigation. The seductiveness of these ends, however, should
never obscure the necessity for careful analysis of whether the issue
asserted as collaterally estopped was both actually determined -and
substantially identical with the present one, lest a litigant be unfairly
denied his day in court. In Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft,2
the Fourth Circuit held that a seemingly ambiguous finding by a state
court in an action to recover on a promissory note that an affirmative
defense of duress based upon an alleged threat of a group boycott had
not been established was conclusive as to whether the threat was in
fact made in a subsequent affirmative antitrust action brought by the
defendant in a federal district court.
Azalea Drive-In Theatre, plaintiff in the federal action, leased
films from defendant distributors under agreements providing for payment of a percentage of the box office receipts. These agreements
also authorized periodic inspections to insure that the theatre was not
1. Also known as a species of res judicata or issue preclusion.

2. The Restatement of Judgments defines the rule as follows: "When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

3. 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976).

